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ABSTRACT

HOW DOES ENGAGEMENT RISK AND THE FOCUS OF THE PCAOB INSPECTION
PROCESS INFLUENCE AUDITORS’ INTERNAL AUDIT RELIANCE DECISIONS?
By
JULIE ANN PETHERBRIDGE
Spring Semester, 2010

Committee Chair:

Dr. William F. Messier, Jr.

Major Department:

Accounting

With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, external auditors face a new regulatory
inspection process in addition to an increase in litigation (or engagement) pressure. It has been
communicated that this new inspection process will place an increased emphasis on the
efficiency of integrated audits while maintaining the same level of effectiveness. In an
experiment, I explore how external auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit function will
be affected by different inspection focuses, varying levels of engagement risk, and the level of
risk associated with the audit test or procedure. While I expect that there will be significant main
effects for inspection focus, engagement risk and the riskiness of the audit test, I explore the
potential presence of a three-way interaction between these three factors. My findings suggest
that the auditor reliance decisions are impacted by differing levels of engagement risk, the focus
of the inspection process, and the riskiness of the audit tests. In general, as engagement risk
increased, auditors’ reliance decreased. Also, as the riskiness of the audit test increased, auditors
placed less reliance on the internal audit function. However, when the focus of the inspection
changed, these factors interacted with one another. Specifically, when auditors faced a focus of
both effectiveness and efficiency, their reliance decisions increased as engagement risk and
riskiness of the test decreased, but when auditors faced a focus of effectiveness only, their
reliance decisions were not impacted by the engagement risk when the riskiness of the test was
high. Thus, the impact of engagement risk on auditors’ reliance decisions depends on the focus
of the inspection process and the riskiness of the tests.

Keywords: Internal audit function; engagement risk; PCAOB inspection process;
Data Availability: Contact the author
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Overview of Research Question
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed in 2002. Its expressed purpose was to restore

investor confidence following a series of corporate scandals and bankruptcies. SOX created the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)1 to oversee external auditing and
corporate governance issues. The PCAOB has the authority to establish auditing standards for
public companies and is responsible for inspecting registered public accounting firms.
One of the major requirements of SOX is that management and the external auditor are to
report on the adequacy of the company’s internal control over financial reporting (ICFR). This is
the most costly aspect of this legislation for companies to implement, since documenting and
testing internal controls requires enormous time and effort. The additional costs of the external
audit have also increased significantly (GAO-06-361, 2006).
PCAOB inspections differ from the peer review process that was in place prior to SOX
for publicly traded companies. The PCAOB is charged “to assess the degree of compliance…
with the Act, the rules of the Board, the rules of the Commission, or professional standards”
(SOX section 104 part (a)). The PCAOB has not disclosed how it chooses specific audits for
inspection, except that its focus is on aspects of the selected audits that are most likely to present
“challenging issues” (PCAOB, 2007 Annual Report). Therefore, there is no basis for firms to
know which of their audits will be selected or what issues the inspectors will be concentrating
on. In light of the new auditing standards on ICFR (AS5), the PCAOB has indicated that its
inspection process will place an increased emphasis on the efficiency of integrated audits while
maintaining the same level of effectiveness (PCAOB Release No. 104-2006-105, 2007 Annual
1

Also referred to as Board.
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Report). Auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function is likely to be affected by the focus of
the PCAOB’s inspection process. If the inspection focus is concerned with a more balanced
approach between effectiveness and efficiency rather than focusing only on effectiveness,
auditors should rely on the internal audit function more when the focus is balanced.
In addition to facing the risks2 from the inspection process, auditors also face increased
litigation (or engagement) pressure because of the corporate failures that lead to the passage of
SOX.3 After the fall of one of the largest accounting firms, Arthur Andersen, public accounting
firms are more concerned about their reputation. Monitoring engagement risk is an integral part
of the audit process. Research has shown that as engagement risk increases, auditors become
more conservative (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996). Thus, under high engagement risk, auditors
are less likely to rely on the internal audit function for audit procedures.
The research question that I investigate is “How will auditors’ reliance decisions on the
work of others (i.e., internal auditors)4 be affected by the competing pressures from different
inspection focuses, varying levels of engagement risk, and the level of risk associated with the
audit test or procedure?” While I expect that there will be significant main effects for inspection
focus, engagement risk, and the riskiness of the audit test, the more interesting prediction is the
potential presence of a three-way interaction between the three factors. In addition, I test whether
auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function varies across the two major types of audit tests:
test of controls and substantive procedures.
1.2

Motivation of the Research Question
SOX set new or enhanced standards for all U.S. public company boards, management,

and public accounting firms. Debate continues over the perceived benefits and costs of SOX.
2

PCAOB has the authority to impose a range of disciplinary sanctions against registered accounting firms.
“Auditor liability: to cap or not to cap?” The Accountant January 31, 2007.
4
From this point forward the “work of others” will be referred to as the internal audit function.
3

2

The SOX mandate with the most perceived cost was section 404, which required management to
issue an assessment on the effectiveness of their entity’s ICFR and the entity’s external auditors
to issue an opinion on the effectiveness of the entity’s ICFR.
1.2.1 PCAOB Auditing Standards
In 2004, the PCAOB issued Auditing Standard 2 (AS2) (PCAOB 2004) to provide
guidance for auditors on how to conduct an audit of ICFR. Almost immediately, AS2 was
criticized by numerous parties for being too costly.5 Part of the criticism of AS2 was that it
involved excessive auditing by requiring unnecessary procedures (i.e. walkthroughs), requiring
internal control testing work in low risk areas, and not allowing auditors to use the internal audit
function. AS2 required that the auditor perform enough of the testing so that his or her own
work provided the principal evidence supporting the auditor’s opinion. This AS2 requirement
limited the use of the internal audit function by the external auditor (PCAOB 2004, p. 111).
In 2007, the PCAOB responded to the criticisms that audits were too costly and not well
integrated by issuing AS5 (PCAOB 2007).6 AS5 requires the external auditor to use a risk-based
approach in conducting an integrated audit of ICFR and of the financial statements.7 AS5 also
has a number of other requirements intended to reduce costs while maintaining the same level of
effectiveness. Under AS5, the auditor is required to use a risk-based approach to determine
whether an account is “significant or not” based on a series of risk factors related to the
likelihood of financial statement error and magnitude of the account. One of the major cost
reductions was the change allowing external auditors to rely more on the internal audit function
5

Surveys by Financial Executives International and CRA International were completed in 2005 a follow up in
2006. Each survey showed costs to be higher than expected and audit fees consisted of approximately 35% of the
total.
6
Passed by the SEC on July 25, 2007.
7
An integrated audit involves the audits of internal control with the audit of the client's financial statements; so that
evidence gathered and tests conducted in the context of either audit contribute to completion of both audits (PCAOB
Release 2005-009).
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by removing AS2’s principal evidence requirement. How this change affects the external
auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit function has not been previously examined and
is an area of increased importance as a result of these regulatory changes.
AS5 allows the auditors to apply professional judgment in determining the extent to
which they will use the internal audit function. PCAOB’s report on the first-year
implementation of AS5 showed the inspectors observed instances “where the extent of the
auditor’s use of the internal audit function to reduce the auditor’s own work was greater than was
appropriate under AS5 considering the level of risk associated with the control being tested”
(PCAOB Release 2009-006, p.6). In addition the inspectors observed numerous instances
“where the extent of the auditors’ retesting of the internal audit function was seemingly unrelated
to the risk involved (PCAOB Release 2009-006, p. 6). The risk associated with an account or
test affects the auditors’ reliance decisions. As the risk associated with a control or test
increases, the need for the auditor to perform his or her own work on the control or account
increases.
1.2.2 Inspection Focus
In conjunction with the change in AS5 to make the requirements of an integrated audit
more efficient, the PCAOB announced that its inspection process would focus not only on the
effectiveness of a registered firm’s audits, but that it would also check to insure that the firm had
implemented AS5 appropriately (PCAOB Release No. 104-2006-105). This included making
sure that firms are also conducted their audits efficiently.
SOX Section 104 requires that registered public accounting firms be inspected by the
PCAOB. The PCAOB’s selection of audits for inspection does not appear to be random but

4

rather based on the riskiness of the audited entity.8 A review of inspection reports shows that
the PCAOB inspection teams have been critical of many of the audits inspected.9 While the
focus of prior inspections has been on the effectiveness of the audit, the PCAOB recently stated
that its future inspections will look at the efficiency of the audit.10 In light of changes required by
AS5 discussed above, inspectors will also focus on how efficiently the firms performed the audit.
More specifically, inspectors will evaluate the degree of integration between the audit of ICFR
and the audit of financial statements, including the use of a top-down approach, proper
assessment of and response to identified risks, and using the internal audit function. In the firstyear inspection reports under AS5, inspectors noted instances where auditor’s relied on the
internal audit function greater than was appropriate considering the level of risk associated with
the control being tested, but they also noted numerous instances where auditors’ retested the
internal audit function when it was unrelated to the risk involved (PCAOB Release 2009-006, p.
6).
I examine two differing PCAOB inspection focuses: One where the focus is on
effectiveness only and one where the focus is a more balanced approach between effectiveness
and efficiency. I expect the auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit function will
increase when the PCAOB’s inspection focus is on effectiveness and efficiency. In contrast, I
expect the auditors’ reliance decision will decrease or remain the same when the PCAOB’s focus
is on effectiveness.

8

PCAOB 2005 Annual Report states “the PCAOB chose those audits, and the particular aspects reviewed, on the
basis of its assessment of the risk of material misstatement or significant auditing deficiencies, as well as firmspecific risks” (p. 8).
9
PCAOB Release No. 2005-023, 2007-004.
10
PCAOB Release No. 104-2006-105, 2007-004.
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1.2.3 The Effect of Engagement Risk
Auditors are facing increased litigation pressure as a result of the corporate failures (e.g.,
Enron and WorldCom) that led to the passage of SOX.11 When faced with increased engagement
(or litigation) risk,12 auditors adjust the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures. Prior
research on engagement risk shows that, in general, auditors become more conservative when
faced with high engagement risk. For example, auditors have been found to allow more
aggressive reporting by clients when engagement risk is low than when engagement risk is high
(Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996). Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996) also show that engagement
risk affects a number of auditor decisions, including evidence gathering choices.
I chose to examine the auditors’ reliance decision under differing engagement risk levels
because auditors face a new regulatory environment as a result of the changes brought on by AS5
and the PCAOB inspection process. The emphasis by the PCAOB on increased efficiencies in
the integrated audit to reduce costs and the increase in engagement risk will likely create a
natural conflict in the auditors’ decision process for evidence gathering. For example, when
engagement risk is low and the inspection process emphasizes increased efficiency, auditors are
likely to rely more on the internal audit function. However, when engagement risk is high and
there is an increased emphasis on efficiency in the inspection process, auditors may not rely on
the internal audit function sufficiently to satisfy PCAOB inspectors.
This study examines auditor reliance decisions under different focuses of the PCAOB
inspection process, engagement risk levels, and riskiness levels of audit tests or procedures.
How each of these factors interacts with one another and affect auditors’ decisions to use the
internal audit function (i.e. internal auditors) is the focus of this research.
11

“Auditor liability: to cap or not to cap?” The Accountant January 31, 2007.
Engagement risk is defined as the risk that the audit firm is exposed to loss or injury from events arising in
connection with the audited financial statements (SAS 47).

12
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1.3

Overview of Methodology
I conduct an experiment that uses experienced auditors (senior associates to partners).

The experiment presented participants with background information about SOX and the PCAOB,
and case information for a hypothetical company. I used a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-factorial design
with Engagement Risk and Focus of the Inspection as between-subjects factors and Riskiness of
the Test and the Type of Test as repeated measures factors. I manipulated engagement risk at two
levels: high and low. I also manipulated the focus of the PCAOB at two levels (an effectiveness
level and a balanced level). The first level serves as a control condition while the second level
serves as the test condition. For the repeated measures factors, the participants make eight
reliance decisions on four tests of controls and four substantive procedures that vary based on
their riskiness (high and low). Each test is measured on an 11 point scale from no reliance to
moderate reliance to extensive reliance. Four dependent variables for each participant are
constructed by using the average responses for the two types of tests (tests of controls and
substantive procedures) and the two levels of riskiness for the tests.
1.4

Overview and Discussion of Findings
My findings suggest that auditor reliance decisions are impacted by differing levels of

engagement risk, the focus of PCAOB inspection process, and the riskiness of audit tests. In
addition, the auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function varies by the type of audit test. In
general, as engagement risk increased, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function decreased.
Also, as the riskiness of the test decreased, the auditor placed more reliance on the internal audit
function. However, these factors interacted with one another. Specifically, when auditors
planned low riskiness tests, the change in their reliance decisions was based on the level of
engagement risk with the balanced focus of inspection always resulting in more reliance than the

7

effectiveness focus of inspection. When auditors planned high riskiness tests, the auditors’
reliance decisions did not differ for the effectiveness focus of the inspection process across both
levels of engagement risk, whereas in the balanced focus of inspection their reliance decisions
were higher when engagement risk was low relative to when engagement risk was high.
I also found that the auditors’ reliance decisions varied by tests of controls and
substantive procedures. First, auditors relied more on the internal audit function to conduct tests
of controls than substantive procedures. Second, when planning test of controls, auditors’ rely
more on the internal audit function when the focus of the PCAOB inspection focus is balanced,
the riskiness of the test is low, and the engagement risk is low. Third, the auditors’ reliance
decisions when planning substantive procedures, shows the following. First, when considering
reliance on the internal audit function to perform substantive procedures, auditors’ reliance
decisions depend on the level of engagement risk and not the focus of the inspection. Second,
when riskiness of the substantive test is low, the auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function
was not impacted by the focus of the PCAOB inspection process. Third, when the riskiness of
the substantive test was high, the auditors relied more on the internal audit function when the
focus of the PCAOB’s inspection process was balanced.
1.5

Contribution of Research
The proposed research has important implications for auditors, regulators, academics and

other interested stakeholders. First, there are no research studies that I am aware of that examine
how the PCAOB’s inspection process influences auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit
function. This is important given the recent changes imposed by the PCAOB. Thus, this study
extends the audit literature by examining how the inspection process by the PCAOB affects
auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal auditor function (Gramling 1999, Felix et al. 2001,

8

Felix et al. 2005). Second, AS5 allows the external auditor to rely more on the internal audit
function when conducting an audit of ICFR. My findings suggest that auditors’ reliance
decisions may be compromised and result in unintended consequences from this regulatory
change. For example, when the riskiness of the test is high, instead of conducting the work
themselves, the auditor may rely on the internal audit function and not collect the appropriate
corroborating evidence. Third, auditors face increased pressure to maintain a high level of
effectiveness while increasing the efficiency of their audits. To my knowledge, there is little
empirical research in auditing related to the tradeoff between effectiveness and efficiency. This
study examines the effectiveness/efficiency tradeoff by having auditors make reliance decisions
where there is an increased emphasis on efficiency holding effectiveness constant. Therefore,
the impact of effectiveness/efficiency pressures is directly examined. When auditors’ are under
pressures to increase efficiency and hold effectiveness constant, they will rely more on the
internal audit function than if they are under pressure only for effectiveness. Lastly, prior
research has examined how engagement risk influences auditors’ decision-making behavior (e.g.,
Knapp 1985; Walo 1995; Hackenbrack & Nelson 1996; Johnstone 2000). This study extends this
risk-based auditing research by examining engagement risk under the new regulatory pressures
of the PCAOB inspection process. The impact of engagement risk on auditors’ reliance
decisions depends on the focus of the PCAOB inspection process and the riskiness of the tests.
When the focus of the PCAOB inspection is on a more balanced approach, auditors’ reliance
decisions are greater the lower the engagement risk, but when the focus of the PCAOB
inspection is on an effectiveness approach and the riskiness of the test is high, auditors’ reliance
decisions do not differ between the level of engagement risk.

9

1.6

Organization of Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides

background information and a review of relevant literature. Chapter 3 develops applicable
theories and hypotheses. Chapter 4 describes the experiment and related methodology. Chapter
5 presents a discussion of results. Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation with a summary of
findings, and a discussion of the contributions, limitations, and avenues for future research.

10

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides background information and reviews relevant literature. Section
2.1 discusses SOX and PCAOB regulations. Section 2.2 reviews prior research on external
auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function. Section 2.3 examines engagement risk while
Section 2.4 examines audit efficiency. Lastly, Section 2.5 closes with a brief summary.
2.1

SOX and PCAOB Regulation
The internal audit function has had an increasing role in the external audit over the last

decade due to changes in regulation. First, in 2002, SOX was passed with requirements that (1)
companies establish and maintain an adequate system of internal controls sufficient to ensure
reliable financial reporting and (2) management assess the effectiveness of internal control. In
addition, the external auditor is also required to report on the effectiveness of the entity’s internal
control. The internal audit function plays a major role in such activities. Second, since
November 2003, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) requires that listed companies must
maintain an internal audit function to provide management and the audit committee with ongoing
assessments of the company’s risk management processes and system of internal control (NYSE
Section 303A).
2.1.1 PCAOB Inspection Process
The PCAOB is responsible for oversight of the integrated financial statement audits of
publicly-traded corporations. Part of this oversight includes issuing auditing standards that
provide guidance over auditor ethics and independence; supervision; hiring and development of
audit personnel; and client acceptance and continuation. The PCAOB is also responsible for
11

inspecting auditing firms to ensure their compliance with SOX regulations and professional
auditing standards. The PCAOB can impose sanctions on accounting firms, including civil
penalties and suspensions from auditing public companies. The PCAOB may refer these matters
to the SEC and the Department of Justice for further legal action if it believes such action is
needed.
The Board conducts a continuing program of inspections to assess the degree of
compliance of each registered public accounting firm and associated persons of that firm with
SOX, the rules of the Board, the rules of the Commission, and professional standards. PCAOB
inspections are designed to identify and address weaknesses and deficiencies related to how a
firm conducts audits. To achieve that goal, Board inspections include reviews of certain aspects
of selected audits performed by a firm and reviews of other matters related to a firm's quality
control system. The Board sets its own rules for the inspection process.
2.1.2 The Potential Impact of AS5 on the Integrated Audit
The PCAOB issued AS2 in 2004 to provide guidance in conducting the integrated audit
for public companies. This standard was criticized for being too costly as a result of excessive
auditing by requiring unnecessary procedures and limiting the use of the internal audit function
through the principal evidence requirement.13 In 2007, the PCAOB issued AS5 with the
intention of providing audit guidance to decrease audit costs by encouraging auditors to focus on
the matters that are most important to internal controls.14 AS5 incorporates a top-down approach
that begins with an assessment of company-level controls and financial statement elements and
then links them to significant accounts, relevant assertions, and to significant processes.15 AS5

13

Refer to Chapter 1
See SEC meeting, July 25, 2007.
15
PCAOB Release No. 2007-005A, June 12, 2007. AS5 codifies the guidance introduced on a policy statement
regarding implementation of AS2 (PCAOB Release No. 2005-009, May 16, 2005).
14
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emphasizes the importance of risk assessment and encourages external auditors to place more
reliance on the internal audit function (e.g., internal auditors), especially in areas of lower risk.
AS5 also allows multi-location site visits to be determined based on risk rather than coverage
and allows audit risk assessments to be influenced by the results obtained in prior audits. Such
guidance requires that the risk assessments should drive the external auditors’ focus towards
higher risk areas.
With respect to the integrated audit and the internal audit function, AS5 provides the
following guidance: The auditor should evaluate the extent to which he or she will use the
internal audit function to reduce the work the auditor might otherwise perform himself or herself
(paragraph 16). Thus, the auditor may use work performed by, or receive direct assistance from,
internal auditors, company personnel (in addition to internal auditors), and third parties working
under the direction of management or the audit committee that provide evidence about the
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting. In an integrated audit, the auditor also
may use this work to provide evidence supporting the auditor's assessment of control risk for
purposes of the audit of the financial statements. The extent to which the auditor may use the
internal audit function in an audit of internal control also depends on the risk associated with the
control being tested. As the risk associated with a control increases, the need for the auditor to
perform his or her own work on the control increases.
2.1.3 Current Research on the PCAOB Inspection Process
Currently, there has been little research on the PCAOB inspection process. Lennox and
Pittman (2009) examined audit firm supervision since the PCAOB began inspections. They find
that audit clients do not perceive the PCAOB’s inspection reports as valuable information for
signaling audit quality and examining both peer reviews and inspection reports under the new

13

regulatory regime, there appears to be less transparency about audit firm quality. Several studies
deal with the deficiencies noted in the inspection reports (Hermanson et al. 2007; Gramling et al.
2008).
2.2

Prior Research on External Auditors’ Reliance on the Internal Audit Function
External auditors have always had the option of relying on the internal audit function in

conducting a financial statement audit. SAS No. 65 (AU 322) was the first auditing standard to
formalize the process to be followed by the external auditor when using internal auditors for
assistance.16 SAS No. 65 (AICPA, April 1991) outlines two principal ways in which internal
auditors’ work may impact the external audit process for a financial statement audit. First, the
external auditor can evaluate the competence, objectivity and work performed of the internal
audit function and if it is deemed proficient or acceptable, the auditor can rely on the internal
audit work. Second, the internal audit function can provide direct assistance to the auditor on a
financial statement audit.
2.2.1 Research on internal audit function
Research on the reliance of the internal audit function began with empirical studies that
developed a list of factors, or indicators, for evaluating the competency (Gibbs and Schroeder,
1979), performance, and objectivity (Clark et al. 1980; Clark et al. 1981) of internal auditors.
Brown (1983) was the first study to focus on factors that might be considered important by
external auditors in evaluating the reliability of an internal audit function, and the degree to
which consistent use is made of those factors across auditors. Brown used a questionnaire that
included a brief description of a manufacturing concern and then provided 48 different scenarios
of internal audit function characteristics which encompassed competence, objectivity, and
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SAS No. 9 “The Effect of an Internal Audit Function on the Scope of the Independent Audit (AICPA 1975)
provided the three main areas: objectivity, quality and competency, but did not provide any benchmarks or
measurement criteria. The reliance decision was left up to auditor judgment.
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performance dimensions. The participants made degree of reliability judgments on each
scenario. Brown found that independence and previous years’ audit work were the primary
factors used by the auditors, regardless of their firm affiliation or years of audit experience.
Schneider (1984) ran three experiments to identify descriptive models of how external
auditors evaluate the three factors (competence, objectivity, and work performed by the internal
audit function) identified in SAS No. 65. Schneider (1985b) examined the degree of agreement
among auditors in evaluating the internal audit function and he found a high degree of consensus.
Schneider (1985a) examined both the extent to which auditors would rely on the internal audit
function, and the relationship between the reliance decision and their evaluation of internal audit
strength. The three factors were used to construct various case profiles of an internal audit
function. The auditors ranked these profiles in terms of strength and then indicated the amount
of external audit hours they would assign for each profile. The results showed that auditors
generally relied on internal auditing to reduce their external audit work and the relative
importance weights of the three factors were approximately the same for the reliance decisions
and for the evaluation judgments.
Margheim (1986) examined whether external auditors adjusted the nature and extent of
audit procedures due to reliance on internal auditors and, if so, whether this reliance related to
the competence, objectivity, and work performed by the internal auditors. She found that
auditors adjusted their planned audit hours when a high level of competence/work performance
existed but they did not adjust their hours to different degrees of internal auditor objectivity.
Additional studies examined external auditor reliance on the internal audit function along
the three factors prescribed by professional auditing standards (Brown and Karan 1986; Edge
and Farley 1991; Felix et al. 2001; Maletta 1993; Maletta and Kida 1993; and Messier and
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Schneider 1988). While these studies find differences in ranking the importance of the three
factors, they do provide evidence that each factor used to evaluate the internal audit function
influenced the extent to which external auditors rely on the work performed by internal auditors.
2.2.2 Other factors affecting reliance
A number of research studies examined other factors that affected the external auditor’s
reliance decision. Whittington and Margheim (1993) examined materiality and inherent risk and
varied each on two levels in an experimental setting. The results showed that at the low
materiality level the audit managers assigned more tests of control work to the internal auditors,
but the substantive work appeared to depend on the nature of the individual assertion’s evidence.
Inherent risk factors were not found to be significant. DeZoort et al. (2001) examined the effects
of incentive compensation and a consulting role across two different routine tasks: an objective
test of controls task and a subjective inventory valuation task. They found auditors’ reliance
decisions were only impacted when there was incentive compensation under a subjective task,
and consulting roles had no effect under either task. Gramling (1999) conducted an experiment
that examined whether audit managers’ planning decisions are influenced by client fee pressure
and by the preferences of the audit partner. She found that audit managers under high fee
pressure relied more on the internal audit’s work than under less fee pressure, and partner
preferences influenced the audit managers’ reliance decisions, but the results did not show an
interaction between fee pressure and partner preferences. Felix et al. (2001) found that the
internal audit contribution to the external audit is influenced by internal audit quality and
conditional on the level of inherent risk, the availability of internal audit and the extent of
coordination between internal and external auditors. Finally, Felix et al. (2005) examined how
external audit evidence gathering choices are influenced by nonaudit fees and client pressures.
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They found that when significant nonaudit services are provided, client pressure significantly
increases the extent of internal audit reliance. Each of these studies showed that a number of
various factors (i.e. level of materiality, incentive compensation, fee pressure, and nonaudit
services) can influence the external auditors’ evaluation of the internal audit function.
2.2.3

Outsourcing
A number of recent research studies examined the effects of sourcing arrangements on

the external auditors’ reliance decision. The internal audit function has traditionally been seen as
internal to the business, but a number of companies outsourced some or all of their internal audit
activities (Cheney 1995; Aldihizer and Cashell 1996; Powell 1997). Prior research has examined
the extent of internal audit outsourcing (e.g., Pelfrey and Peacock 1995; Petravick 1997) and
other studies have examined the effects of performance of the dual role of internal and external
audits on external auditor judgments (e.g., Lowe et al. 1999; Swanger and Chewning 2001;
James 2003). Other studies examined whether the in-house auditors or outsourcing the internal
audit function impacts the auditors reliance decisions. For example, Ahlawat and Lowe (2004)
examined the impact of outsourcing on internal auditor judgments. Participants in their study
were from corporations (in-house) and Big 4 accounting firms (outsourced). Each participant
completed a case study and the results found that the source of the internal audit provider did not
impact the external auditors’ judgment decisions. Glover et al. (2008) used external auditors to
complete an experimental case in which they manipulated the internal audit sourcing, and they
found no difference when both in-house and outsourced were considered objective.
2.3

Engagement Risk
Engagement risk refers to the risk that the audit firm is exposed to loss or injury from

litigation, adverse publicity, or other events arising in connection with the audited financial
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statements (Johnstone 2000; Bell et al. 2000). Prior audit research demonstrates that engagement
risk influences auditors’ decision-making behavior (e.g., Knapp 1985; Walo 1995, Hackenbrack
and Nelson 1996; Johnstone 2000) and is an aspect of the overall audit environment (Bell et al.
2000; POB 2000). More specifically, research has shown that when auditors were faced with
higher engagement risk, they responded by requiring more conservative reporting and justifying
their choices with conservative interpretation of accounting standards (Hackenbrack and Nelson
1996).
Under AS5, the auditor must consider the internal audit reliance decision as part of the
integrated audit. As the risk of a material misstatement increases or the degree of subjectivity
increases, the need for the auditor to perform his or her own tests of the assertions increases.17
Therefore, as engagement risk increases, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function is likely
to decrease. However, there are conflicting results in prior research that show that in high risk
situations other factors may affect the reliance decisions and not only engagement risk.
Research has found that auditors increased their audit hours when faced with higher engagement
risk (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Clarkson and Simunic 1994) while Maletta and Kida (1993)
found that in high risk situations the external auditors’ reliance decisions depends on the design
of the accounting control policies and procedures and not on the engagement risk.18
2.4

Audit Efficiency
Auditors are always facing a tradeoff between effectiveness and efficiency concerns on

an audit. Clark (1921) links efficiency and effectiveness by making the argument that a system
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In making judgments about the extent of the internal auditors’ work on the auditors’ procedures, the auditors
consider the materiality of financial statement amounts, the risk of material misstatement, and the degree of
subjectivity involved in the evaluation of evidence (PCAOB AU Section 322).
18
Other research on litigation risk includes client risk factors, audit effort, and audit fees (Pratt and Stice, 1994;
O’Keefe et al., 1994; Johnstone and Bedard, 2003; Clarkson and Simunic, 1994; Simunic and Stein, 1996).
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is “inefficient when it is cheap but ineffective.” There are few theoretical models and relatively
little empirical research on audit efficiency. Auditing practitioners and researchers tend to define
efficiency as accomplishing the audit task in less time, thereby increasing profitability or
reducing overall audit cost (e.g. Hollingshead, 1996; Davis and Solomon, 1989; Libby, 1995).
Recently, Knechel et al. (2009) found that audits are more efficient for clients that are larger,
have a December year-end, and are highly automated, but that audits are less efficient when the
auditor relies on internal control, tax services are provided, and the client has subsidiaries. This
study developed a model on audit production but relied on data from a 1991 survey. Thus, the
results that relying on internal controls decrease efficiency may not hold in the post-Sox
environment that requires an integrated audit. The PCAOB defines efficiency as the auditor
achieving the objectives described in the Board’s standards with the least expenditure of effort
and resources (PCAOB Release No. 2005-023).
2.5 Summary of Chapter 2
Overall, there is little research on the PCAOB inspection process and how it may affect
the external auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit function. Prior research on external
auditors’ reliance decisions has shown that the reliance depends on a number of different factors.
Several studies show that the internal auditors’ competency, performance, and objectivity are
what the external auditor examines when relying on the internal audit function. Other factors that
affect the external auditors’ internal audit reliance decisions include materiality, incentive
compensation, client fee pressure, and non-audit services. Engagement risk generally has the
effect of reducing the external auditors’ reliance decisions, but there is a natural conflict when
auditors are facing a need for audit efficiency. This line of research leads the current study into
the development of the hypotheses examined.
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CHAPTER 3
DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

This chapter describes relevant theory and develops the formal hypotheses to be tested.
Section 3.1 through Section 3.5 describes the theory leading to each hypothesis. Lastly, Section
3.6 contains a brief summary.
3.1

Motivated Reasoning Theory
People rely on cognitive processes and representations to arrive at their desired

conclusions; however, motivation plays a role in determining which of these will be used in a
given situation. I define motivation as having a wish, desire, or preference that concerns the
outcome of a given reasoning task (Kunda 1990). It is the process of reasoning such as forming
impressions, determining one’s beliefs and attitudes, evaluating evidence, and making decisions.
This type of motivated reasoning falls into two major categories: (1) reasoning driven by
accuracy goals or (2) reasoning driven by directional goals (Kruglanski 1980; Kruglanski &
Ajzen 1983; Kruglanski & Klar 1987; see also Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly 1989; Pyszczynski
& Greenberg 1987; Lodge & Taber 2000). Both types of goals affect reasoning by influencing
the choice of beliefs and strategies applied to a given problem. Accuracy goals lead to the use of
those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate, whereas directional goals lead
to the use of those that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion. This study
examines reasoning under directional goals.
Kunda (1990) proposed that people motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion attempt
to be rational and construct a justification for their desired conclusion that would persuade a
dispassionate observer. The biasing role of goals is thus constrained by one’s ability to construct
a justification for the desired conclusion. There is the assumption that directional goals may

20

influence which beliefs and rules are accessed and applied on a given occasion. Thus, this
assumption seems reasonable because there is considerable evidence that individuals access
different beliefs and rules on different occasions. Individuals endorse different attitudes
(Salancik & Conway 1975; Snyder 1982), express different self-concepts (Fazio, Effrein, &
Falender 1981), make different social judgments (Higgins & King 1981), and use different
statistical rules (Kunda & Nisbett 1986; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda 1983).
Prior research in accounting suggests that auditors have directional goals. For example,
Farmer et al. (1987) conducted an experiment using auditors with varying levels of experience to
choose whether to agree with a client’s decision to use an accounting approach for which there
was no clear precedent. The study found that the threat of a loss of the client led to more
aggressive reporting, but the threat of a lawsuit discouraged aggressive reporting. Lord (1992)
and Roberts and Cargile (1994) found similar results. Finally, Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996)
found that auditors tend to make the reporting decisions favored by the incentives they face.
Specifically, auditors preferred aggressive reporting when engagement risk was moderate or low,
but preferred conservative reporting when engagement risk was high.
The effect of directional goals on auditors’ evidence evaluation affects auditors’
decisions throughout the audit process. In the planning phase, the auditor searches for, and
evaluates, information and terminates this search when sufficient information has been gathered
to generate a final assessment. The auditors’ final assessment is then used to make a reporting
decision. Prior research provides evidence that directional goals influence an individuals’ initial
assessment of a neutral attribute situation (Russo et al. 1996) or when less balanced information
is provided (Russo et al. 1998). Blay (2005) examined independence threats from litigation risk
using a going concern situation. Auditors with high threats to their independence evaluated their
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clients as more likely to survive, both initially and as they proceeded to evaluate new
information. Auditors facing high litigation risk evaluated clients as less likely to survive at the
completion of the evidence evaluation process. Kadous et al. (2003) examined the gap between
an aggressive method that a client prefers and the most appropriate method. They found that
when there is ambiguity in the method choice, auditors used directional goals to make their
choice decisions.
3.2

Engagement Risk
Engagement risk influences auditor behavior and is one of the leading risks facing the

audit profession (Lowe et al. 2002). Auditors must consider engagement risk throughout the
audit process (i.e. from client acceptance/retention to issuance of the audit reports on an
integrated audit), and the effect of engagement risk on evidence gathering choices is potentially
influenced by auditor incentives. For example, auditors have been found to allow more
aggressive reporting by clients when engagement risk is low (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996).
As discussed in Chapter 2, prior audit research demonstrates that engagement risk
influences auditors’ decision-making behavior (e.g., Knapp 1985; Walo 1995, Hackenbrack and
Nelson 1996; Johnstone 2000) and is an aspect of the overall audit environment (Bell et al. 2000;
POB 2000). More specifically, research has shown that when auditors are faced with higher
engagement risk, they respond by requiring conservative reporting and justify their choices with
conservative interpretation of accounting standards (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996).
One possible reason for this behavior is that auditors, many times, are blamed when
investors and creditors suffer financial losses (Stice 1991). When faced with relatively high
levels of engagement risk, auditors typically increase audit fees, planned audit hours, and
evidence requirements (Simunic 1980; Pratt and Stice 1994; Houston et al 1999), particularly in
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areas involving a great deal of subjective judgment such as accounting estimates and accruals
(Lys and Watts 1994). Engagement risk focuses auditors’ attention on making accurate
decisions (Palmrose 1988; Stice 1991) and auditors are less willing to accept errors in financial
statements as engagement risk increases (Chang and Hwang 2003; Farmer et al. 1987). Given
the litigious environment in which the audit profession operates, auditors are acutely aware that
they must be prepared to defend their decisions to jurors should the need arise (Lowe and
Reckers 2000). Staw (1980) refers to this phenomenon as prospective rationality, where
decisions are made with foresight knowledge that decisions may need to be defended in the
future. Auditors will attempt to identify the most defensible course of action (Tetlock 1985;
Messier and Quilliam 1992).
Because the effect of engagement risk can be driven by varying incentives, Gibbins
(1984) proposed that when auditors are faced with uncertainty or risk, they tend to focus on the
potential negative consequences of each decision option because the penalties for error are more
significant than the rewards for positive results. Emby and Gibbins (1988) suggest that auditors
will also require more justification in situations with an element of risk due to an increased
concern over negative consequences. When engagement risk is high, auditors are more likely to
conduct audit work themselves rather than rely on the internal audit’s work. Based on the
previous arguments, I propose the first hypothesis:
H1: As engagement risk increases, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function will
decrease.
3.3

Riskiness of the Audit Tests
As discussed previously, specifically with engagement risk, the risk associated with an

audit test should also affect the auditors’ reliance decisions. Under AS5, the auditor is required
to use a risk-based approach based on a series of risk factors. As the riskiness of the test
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increases, the likelihood that the external auditor will perform the test increases. This leads to
the following hypothesis:
H2:

3.4

As the riskiness of the test increases, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit
function will decrease.

The Interaction of Engagement Risk, Focus of the Inspection Process, and Riskiness
of the Test
Audit firms face pressures from numerous sources (i.e. clients, regulators, markets) to

increase both the effectiveness and efficiency of their audits (Lowe et al. 2002). AS5 states that
the auditor is solely responsible for obtaining sufficient competent evidence to support his or her
opinions on an integrated audit. However, the PCAOB has cautioned auditors that repeating
work performed by competent professionals within the entity (i.e. internal auditors) would
unnecessarily increase audit costs without producing a corresponding increase in audit quality.
Therefore, auditors are responsible for minimizing redundancy by relying on the internal audit
function where appropriate while still ensuring high audit quality. In such situations, auditors
should attempt to hold effectiveness constant while increasing efficiency. The PCAOB, through
its inspection process, found that auditors did not fully utilize the internal audit function. For
example, the inspectors noted that many auditors duplicated internal auditors work in lower-risk
areas (PCAOB Release 2007-004).
Based on the 2005 inspections, the PCAOB found that auditors lacked efficiency in using
the internal audit function to the extent permitted by AS2 (PCAOB Release 104-2006-105). In
response, the PCAOB announced that it would focus its 2006 inspections on whether auditors
achieved cost-saving efficiencies in audits and its inspectors would check to see whether auditors
took full advantage of the opportunities to use the internal audit function, such as the company’s
internal audit staff (SEC Release 2006-75). Conclusions from the 2006 inspection reports
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revealed that progress was made in improving the efficiency of audits of ICFR, but that auditors
could have increased their use of the internal audit function even more (PCAOB Release 2007004).
As discussed previously, AS5 allows the auditor to apply professional judgment in
determining the extent to which they will use the internal audit function. The PCAOB’s report
on the first-year implementation of AS5 showed that the inspectors observed instances “where
the extent of the auditor’s use of the internal audit function to reduce the auditor’s own work was
greater than was appropriate under AS5 considering the level of risk associated with the control
being tested” (PCAOB Release 2009-006, p.6). In addition the inspectors observed numerous
instances “where the extent of the auditors’ retesting of the internal audit function was seemingly
unrelated to the risk involved (PCAOB Release 2009-006 p. 6). Thus, the PCAOB observed
auditors over-and under-relying on the internal audit function.
Prior research suggests that audit quality is a function of the amount and extent of audit
procedures performed (Dopuch and Simunic 1982). Felix et al. (2001) demonstrated that
reliance on the internal audit function decreased the annual external audit fee, which is one of the
factors motivating the PCAOB to increase the reliance on the internal audit function.
Psychology research suggests that when individuals know the views of their audience prior to
forming an opinion, they adopt the position that they expect will gain favor with the person to
whom they are accountable (see Lerner and Tetlock 1999 and Messier and Quilliam 1992 for
reviews). When the PCAOB places an emphasis on increased efficiency, auditors can reduce
audit hours by relying more on the internal audit function. If the PCAOB (by way of AS5,
inspections, and other pronouncements) puts pressure on auditors to increase efficiency, this is
likely to affect the auditors’ decision to rely on the internal audit function.
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Auditors’ incentives can be influenced by engagement risk and the riskiness of the tests.
While I have predicted a main effect for engagement risk and the riskiness of the tests, I expect
that engagement risk, the riskiness of the test, and the focus of the PCAOB inspection process
will interact in a predicted manner and result in a three-way interaction. More specifically, I
expect that the interaction between engagement risk and focus of the inspection will differ
depending on the level of the riskiness of the test.
Under motivated reasoning theory, decision makers with directionally motivated goals
evaluate information consistent with a desired conclusion, so long as the conclusion is justifiable
(Kunda 1990: Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987). This holds particularly true when a preference
exists prior to the decision stage (Russo et al.1996). The PCAOB is seeking a balanced approach
for the conduct of an integrated audit (i.e. hold effectiveness constant while increasing
efficiency) while auditors face increased engagement risk. Brown et al. (1999) suggest that
when auditors know the preferences of powerful others, auditors may have difficulty
disentangling the preferences of powerful others from their own beliefs.
Auditors should evaluate all relevant information in the evaluation process and should not
be influenced to adjust the evaluation process by potential pressures (e.g. Beckmann and
Gollwitzer 1987). For example, auditors faced with increased engagement risk are less likely to
rely on the internal audit function while pressure from the PCAOB to lower the cost of their
audits should lead to higher reliance on the internal audit function. These two pressures are not
likely to be significant when the riskiness of the test is low. However, when the riskiness of the
test is high, auditors are faced with balancing the competing pressures of engagement risk and
the focus of the PCAOB’s inspection process. Thus, when the riskiness of the test if high, the
auditors’ reliance decisions will vary based on which pressure they believe to be more powerful

26

[engagement risk (risk of litigation) or the PCAOB (risk of sanctions)]. I predict when the
riskiness of the test is low, the PCAOB pressure will prevail, but when the riskiness of the test is
high, I expect the risk of litigation to prevail.
This leads to the following hypotheses:
H3a: When the riskiness of the test is low, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit
function will be higher when the focus of the PCAOB inspection process includes
both a focus of effectiveness and efficiency regardless of the level of engagement
risk.
H3b: When the riskiness of the test is high, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit
function will be higher when the focus of the PCAOB inspection process includes
both a focus of effectiveness and efficiency but only when engagement risk is low.
There will be no difference between the auditors’ reliance on the internal audit
function when the focus of the PCAOB inspection process is between effectiveness
only or includes both effectiveness and efficiency when engagement risk is high.
Thus, H3a predicts that when the riskiness of the test is low, the balanced condition
(includes both the effectiveness and efficiency focus) of the PCAOB focus will dominate the
auditors’ reliance decisions. However, in H3b, where the riskiness of the test is high, the auditors’
reliance decision will be higher in the balanced condition only when engagement risk is low.
Figure 3.1 shows the predicted interaction across each level of the riskiness of the audit tests.
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Figure 3.1: Riskiness of the Test

3.5

Type of Audit Tests: Tests of Controls versus Substantive Procedures
Prior research has shown that auditors rely on the internal auditors’ work only to the

extent that they can assess the competence, objectivity, and performance of the internal audit
function (Brown 1983). Ward’s (1979) research found that “external auditors rely upon internal
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auditors more in connection with internal controls than for direct assistance in performing audit
procedures.” Ward (1979) and Ward and Robertson (1980) examined the nature of the internal
auditors’ work used by external auditors. They found that external auditors relied on internal
auditors to a greater extent in connection with test of controls versus substantive testing.
Margheim (1986) examined both compliance tests and substantive tests and found that the
auditors’ reliance decisions were impacted similarly based on the changes within the three
factors (competence, objectivity, and performance), and not the type of tests. Whittington and
Margheim (1993) found similar results except in the consideration of materiality. They found
that in the low materiality setting, external auditors assigned more work to the internal auditors
in using test of controls (69%) than using substantive testing (55%). They concluded that “even
at a low materiality levels the participant felt that the external auditor had an obligation to
directly perform much of the substantive work, but were very willing to let the internal auditors
perform a large majority of the tests of controls work.” This implies that the size of an account
balance or transaction matters when external auditors test internal controls but not in the
performance of substantive testing. However, Mills (1996) examined the effect of cognitive style
on the external auditors’ reliance decisions and found no difference between test of controls and
the substantive procedures and the other factors examined.
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) advocates an internal control focus when it
defines the scope of internal auditing: "The scope of internal auditing should encompass the
examination and evaluation of the adequacy and effectiveness of the organization's system of
internal control and the quality of performance in carrying out assigned responsibilities" (IIA
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1992).19 Hence; external auditors have more opportunities to rely on internal auditors’ work
when performing tests of controls versus substantive testing.
Prior to SOX, auditors made decisions between tests of controls and substantive
procedures purely on cost/benefit grounds (AU Section 319.44; O’Keefe et al. 1994). Auditors
could set control risk at high and collect only substantive evidence if it was more efficient to do
so. With the passage of SOX, external auditors’ tests of controls have increased because they
need more evidence on controls in order to issue a report on ICFR. Under AS5, auditors are
required to perform tests of controls; and risk assessment underlies this process, including the
selection of the controls to test, and the determination of the audit evidence necessary (AS5,
paragraph 10). Based on prior research and changes to audit regulation related to internal control,
the external auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function should be higher for tests of controls
versus substantive procedures.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H4: Auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function will be higher for test of
controls than substantive procedure.
3.6

Summary of Chapter 3
Drawing on motivated reasoning theory, I examine the different pressures that effect

auditors’ evidence gathering on the internal audit function. I hypothesize that as engagement
risk or the riskiness of the test increases, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function will
decrease. I predict there will be a three-way interaction between engagement risk, the focus of
the PCAOB’s inspection process, and the riskiness of the test. Lastly, I predict that the type of
test (test of controls v. substantive procedures) should impact the auditors’ reliance decision on
19

Current IIA standards under in section 2100-Nature of Work define “the internal audit activity must evaluate and contribute to
the improvement of governance, risk management, and control processes using a systematic and disciplined approach.”
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the internal audit function. Chapter 4 describes the experimental procedure employed to test the
hypothesized effects.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents an overview of the experimental research method used. Section 4.1
describes experimental participants while section 4.2 describes the experimental design. Section
4.3 describes the Case Materials. Section 4.4 describes the experimental procedures while
Section 4.5 describes the hypotheses testing procedures. Section 4.6 concludes with a brief
summary.
4.1

Participants
My choice of participants for the study was based on detailed discussions with two

partners from a major public accounting firm.20 The partners indicated that the final decision on
the extent of the reliance on the internal audit function for an integrated audit rests with the audit
partner and manager. However, they indicated that the in-charge auditor (senior associate)
would participate in the process leading up to the final decision on the extent of the use of the
internal audit function (also see, Glover et al. 2008). Thus, I requested that the participating firms
provide auditors ranging from senior associate to partner to participate in this study.
Seventy-six external auditors participated in this experiment from three major public
accounting firms. Five participants were deleted because four failed one or more of the
manipulation checks and one did not take the task seriously.21 Thus, the final sample consists of
71 auditors (6 partners, 5 senior managers, 20 managers, and 40 senior associates). Table 4.1
contains a summary of relevant demographic data. All participants stated that they have
previously worked on an integrated audit. The average auditing experience is 6.17 years overall
with the experience by rank shown in Table 4.1. Thus, the sample represented an experienced

20
21

These two partners also assisted with the development of the case materials.
See section 5.1 for a discussion of the manipulation checks.
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group of auditors. All participants are CPAs, one participant has a CIA (certified internal auditor)
and 2 participants have a CFE (certified fraud examiner). In total, 55.7 % of the participants
have a master degree.
Table 4.1: Participants’ Descriptive Statistics

Years of Auditing Experience

Years in Current Position

Percentage of Work on
Integrated Audits
No. of Assessment of the
reliance on the Internal Audit
Function
Other Demograpic Data
No. of Industries represented
by Participants
No. of Participants with
experience with integrated
audits
No. of Participants that have
been a Reviewee for peer or
practice review
No. of Participants that have
been a Reviewer for peer or
practice review
CPA
CIA
Education Level- Masters

Partner
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
[Median]
N=6

Senior
Manager
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
[Median]
N=5

Manager
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
[Median]
N=20

Senior
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
[Median]
N=40

Total
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
[Median]
N=71

19.83
(3.710)
[19.50]
5.83
(4.119)
[4.00]
39.17
(36.251)
[30]
22.5
(14.748)
[20]

10.60
(1.342)
[10.00]
3.40
(.894)
[4.00]
77
(16.432)
[80]
9.2
(7.120)
[10]

6.25
(1.803)
[6.00]
1.7
(.801)
[2.00]
61.5
(23.062)
[75]
4.50
(3.411)
[3]

3.53
(1.062)
[3.00]
1.98 (.974)
[2.00]
51.75
(26.879)
[50]
2.45
(3.967)
[1]

6.17
(4.899)
[5.00]
2.32
(1.811)
[2.00]
55.21
(27.024)
[60]
5.20
(7.850)
[2]

5

4

8

6

9

6

5

18

39

68

6

4

13

8

31

5

3

0

1

9

6
0
2

5
0
2

20
2
12

40
0
25

71
2
41
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4.2

Experimental Design

4.2.1 Independent Variables
I employ a full 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-factor design with Engagement Risk (ER) and Focus
of the PCAOB Inspection (FOCUS) as between-subjects factors and Riskiness of the Test
(RiskT) and the Type of Test (TT) as repeated measures.
ER is manipulated at two levels (high and low) and is varied by manipulating information
pertaining to engagement characteristics.22 For the high risk condition, participants were told
that although initial sales were encouraging; the company was narrowly in compliance with
restrictive debt covenants from which waivers had been obtained in the past. Also, management
bonuses were tied to sales targets and the client had recently met those sales targets. Key
financial ratios for the current year were below industry average as they were in the previous
year. The company had been an audit client of the firm for the past two years. The firm had
assessed engagement risk as “High.” For the low risk condition, participants were told that
initial sales were encouraging and the company had no concerns about meeting its restrictive
debt covenants. Also, management bonuses were tied to sales targets and the client had easily
met their sales targets. Key financial ratios for the current year were above industry average as
were as they were in the previous year. The company had been an audit client of the firm for the
past twelve years. The firm had assessed engagement risk as “Low.”
The FOCUS factor was manipulated at two levels: an effectiveness level and a balanced
level. The effectiveness level served as the control level. Participants were told that the firm was
scheduled for its annual inspection by the PCAOB and because of the nature of their firm’s
clients, the PCAOB would use an effectiveness approach when conducting their inspection of the

22

The high and low conditions for engagement risk were developed based on the Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996)
case.
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firm’s integrated audits. Thus, the PCAOB inspection team would focus on how effective the
firm’s audits were in terms of assessing whether the significant risk areas had been properly
evaluated, concluded upon, and documented. The balanced level of this factor indicated that
their firm was scheduled for its annual inspection by the PCAOB and that because of the nature
of their firm’s clients, the PCAOB would use a balanced approach when conducting their
inspection of the firm’s integrated audits. Thus, the PCAOB inspection team would focus on
how effective the firm’s audits were in terms of assessing whether the significant risk areas had
been properly evaluated, concluded upon, and documented. In addition, the PCAOB inspectors
would focus on whether the audits had been conducted in an efficient manner, including how the
internal audit function would be used in the audit of ICFR. Table 4.2 depicts the between-subject
factors in the study.
TABLE 4.2. Experimental Design for Between-Subjects Factors
Focus of the PCAOB Inspection Process
Engagement Risk

Effectiveness

Balanced

Low

xa

xb

High

xd

xc

RiskT and TT are tested as repeated measures. RiskT was examined at two levels: high
and low riskiness. There were also two levels of TT: tests of controls and substantive procedures.
In developing the materials, I used four tests of controls and four substantive procedures with
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two of each of these procedures determined to be high risk and two to be low risk.23 Table 4.3
presents the within-subjects factors.
TABLE 4.3 Experimental Design for the Within-Subject Factors
Riskiness of the Tests
Type of Tests

Low Risk

High Risk

Test of Controls

x1

x2

Substantive Procedures

x4

x3

This 2 x 2 design can be depicted in each cell of Table 4.2.
4.2.2

Dependent Variables
Participants were asked to make planned reliance decisions on the internal audit function

for the four tests of controls and four substantive procedures on an 11 point scale ranging from
no reliance (0) to moderate reliance (5) to extensive reliance (10). I developed four dependent
variables for each participant by using the average responses in each of the cells contained in
Table 4.3 for the within-subject variables. For example, x 1 was determined by taking the mean
for the two low risk tests of controls, x 2 was determined by taking the mean for the two high risk
tests of controls, and so on.
4.3

Case Materials
The experimental case was developed using materials from SOX, PCAOB website,

PCAOB inspection reports, AS5, Hackenbrack and Nelson’s case (1996), Margheim’s case
(1986) and several studies dealing with the reliance on the internal audit function. I started by

23

The two partners noted above assisted in developing the appropriate terminology for each of the independent
variables (also see development of case materials in section 4.3).
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providing a preliminary draft of the materials to one of the partners mentioned above for
comments. Several rounds of revisions and discussions were conducted with this partner. To
validate the instrument once a final draft was developed, I had two different audit partners from
the same firm and one from another public accounting firm examine the instrument and its
variables for realism and to ensure that it captured the data that I was intending to measure and
manipulate. Before finalization of the instrument, two of the three partners participated in a
conference call and recommended final adjustments to the instruments.
The materials were extensively pilot tested. First, thirty Master of Accounting students
paper tested the instrument for understandability and clarity. Second, ten auditors from a number
of sources completed the instrument. Finally, 16 subjects from one major accounting firm
completed the instrument to ensure that the variables were capturing what the experiment was
attempting to examine and that the manipulations were effective. For the second and third
rounds, each subject provided feedback by email or discussed the instrument with me.
The final case materials first presented the participants with the background information
about SOX, the PCAOB inspection process, and major changes that occurred with the issuance
of AS5 that affected the use of the internal audit function. The description included the
responsibilities of the PCAOB and their ability to impose sanctions. It also described the
inspection process and it stated that the Board sets its own rules, standards, and inspection
approach. The background information then introduced the participants to the two approaches
that the board could utilize in the inspection process. The case then provided a general
definition of both approaches in the background information and later in the case it gave case
specific information about which approach in was being used by the Board. At this point, each
participant was given the following descriptions of the two approaches: When using the
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effectiveness approach, the PCAOB inspectors would focus on whether sufficient appropriate
evidence had been obtained to afford a reasonable basis for an opinion regarding the financial
statements under examination. When using the balanced approach, the PCAOB inspectors
would focus on effectiveness, but also consider the efficiency of those audits. Lastly, in the
background information, the materials described the guidance for auditors in regards to using the
internal audit function.
The case materials next provided the participants with the company overview, description
of its revenue process, its internal audit function, and the manipulated level (effectiveness or
balanced) of the PCAOB inspection process.
The company overview stated that the hypothetical company was a leading developer of
digital laser imaging technologies. The description was based on a real company that was
selected for a PCAOB inspection in 2006. The independent variable for engagement risk was
introduced to the participants in the company overview and was included in the brief description
of the hypothetical company. It included the specific engagement risk manipulation information
that was adapted from Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996).
Next, the materials provided a description of the revenue process24 that was based on
Margheim’s (1986) and Whittington & Margheim (1993) audit program case, but adapted to the
hypothetical company. Major factors included that accounts receivable have been and continue
to be material, past confirmation efforts have been effective with good response rates, the
composition of receivables is relatively unchanged from past audits, material audit adjustments
are recorded occasionally for receivable balance misstatements, and no discrepancies were

24

The revenue process was used because it poses a significant audit risk to auditors and is normally considered a
high risk area. In Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99: Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
(SAS99), the revenue process is an area described as a significant risk area.

37

identified in any of the three current year quarterly reviews. This description was identical for
all participants.
The case then described that the internal audit department employs 25 personnel with a
director, 4 managers, 5 senior auditors and 15 staff auditors (Mills, 1996). Each of the personnel
had at least a CPA or a CIA certification (Brown, 1983; Messier & Schneider, 1988), each has at
least a bachelors degree (Gibbs & Schroeder, 1980; Messier & Schneider, 1988), the internal
auditor function has an average of 3 years experience with a range of 1 to 20 years experience
(Messier & Schneider, 1988), and the internal audit reports their findings directly to the chairman
of the audit committee (Gibbs & Schroeder, 1980; Brown, 1983; Schneider, 1984; Messier &
Schneider, 1988). Lastly, the description stated that the audit team has found the internal audit
function to be competent and objective. It also states that the internal audit function has been
relied upon in the prior years. This description is the same for all instruments.
Next, the case introduced the second independent variable, the PCAOB inspection
process. Participants were given case specific information on either the effectiveness or
balanced approach to the PCAOB inspection process.
After reading the background information and case materials, participants were asked to
provide their reliance decisions on four tests of controls and four substantive procedures. These
tests and procedures were based on Margheim (1986) and Whittington & Margheim (1993) audit
program case25 and half were high risk and half were low risk which allowed the auditors to
make reliance decisions in both high and low risk areas.
Case questions and manipulation checks followed. Participants were asked five questions
about the case. Two were about the engagement risk manipulation, one was about the PCAOB’s

25

Three partners from two firms assessed whether the procedures were high or low risk and also modified the
procedures for clarity and realism.
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focus of inspection manipulation, one asked about the likelihood of that the engagement would
be selected for a PCAOB inspection, and the last was to rate the internal audit function.
The next section asked participants to rate the riskiness of the test of controls and audit
procedures that they had previously evaluated for the reliance on the work of the internal audit
function. Riskiness was assessed in terms of the assertion(s) being tested along a continuum
from low to high risk using an 11 point scale ranging from low riskiness (0) to moderate
riskiness (5) to high riskiness (10). These assessments served as a manipulation check on the
riskiness of the audit procedures.
Lastly, participants completed a post-experimental questionnaire. This was used to
account for individual and firm differences among participants. Completion of the instrument
took approximately 20 minutes. The experimental instrument is contained in Appendix A.
4.4

Experimental Procedure
Participants received an email giving a very brief description of the task and a link to a

website. Once the participants accessed the website, participants were provided with a brief
explanation of the nature of the task. They were then provided an informed consent. Once
consented, each participant was randomly assigned to one of eight sets of instruments (2
different orders for the test of controls and audit procedures presented) based upon the last two
digits of their social security number. Upon completion, responses were downloaded and
removed from website as required by the University’s consent procedures.
4.5

Hypotheses Testing Procedures
I first ran the full 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-factor design. H1 predicts as engagement risk

increases, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function will decrease. Hence, to test H1, I
examine the main effect for ER in the full model. H2 predicts a main effect on the riskiness of
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the test; thus to test H2, I examine the main effect for RiskT in the full model. Overall, H3a and
H3b predict a three-way interaction: ER x FOCUS x RiskT and I examine this in the full model.
Table 4.4 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design model for H3
RiskT
Low
High

ER
Low
High
Low
High

Focus
Effectiveness
xA
xC
xE
xG

Balanced
xB
xD
xF
xH

To examine H3a & H3b, I refer to Table 4.4. H3a predicts when the riskiness of the test is
low, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function will be higher in the balanced condition of
the focus of the PCAOB inspection regardless of the level of engagement risk. Thus, I test
whether x A + x D = x B + x C. H3b predicts when the riskiness of the test is high, auditors’
reliance on the internal audit function will be higher in the balanced condition, but only when
engagement risk is low and there will not be a difference when engagement risk is high. I test
whether x E + x G < x F + x H. Lastly, H4 predicts that auditors’ reliance decisions will be higher
for tests of controls versus substantive procedures; hence, to test H4, I examine the main effect
for TT in the full model.
Additional analyses are also conducted to evaluate other significant interactions that
occur in the full model and related to TT. I test these interactions by computing simple effects
tests for each interaction. I also ran all models separately using only test of controls and only
substantive procedures.
Lastly, I tested for the following covariates: (1) experience effects (seniors versus
managers/partners), (2) firm effects across the three firms (3 levels), (3) professional certification
(CPA versus no certification), (4) if participant had been a reviewer (reviewer versus have not
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been a reviewer) or a reviewee (reviewee or have not been a reviewee) under the peer reviews,
(5) educational level (undergraduate versus master’s degree), (6) involved in an integrated audit
(involved or have not been involved in an integrated audit), and (7) experience with integrated
audits (used the percentage of time spent on integrated audits). None of these covariates were
significant in any of the analyses.
4.6

Summary of Chapter 4
Chapter 4 describes the experimental method employed to test the hypotheses set forth in

Chapter 3. In the experiment, participants were presented with a hypothetical company and
asked to make planned reliance decisions on the internal audit function. Using a full 2 x 2 x 2 x
2 mixed model, participants were assigned to one of four manipulations. Chapter 5 presents
descriptive information regarding the data collected via the experiment and describes the
statistical techniques employed to test hypotheses 1 through 5.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
Chapter 5 describes the results of testing the research hypotheses. Data collection
procedures are described in Chapter 4. Section 5.1 presents the manipulation checks and Section
5.2 presents the descriptive statistics. Section 5.3 describes the overall full model. Section 5.4
through Section 5.7 presents results from hypotheses testing and Section 5.8 provides additional
analysis. Finally, Section 5.9 concludes Chapter 5 with a brief summary.
5.1

Manipulation Checks
I conducted a number of manipulation checks. First, each participant was asked to

indicate whether SunTek’s engagement risk was high or low based on the information that they
received. Seventy-five of the 76 participants properly responded to this question (99 percent). I
also used a second manipulation check for engagement risk. I asked the participants to report the
length in years of their firm’s audit relationship with SunTek, Inc. In the high risk condition the
firm’s tenure was two years while it was twelve years in the low risk condition. Participants were
asked to select the length of the firm’s tenure using three ranges (1-5 years, 5-10 years, 10-15
years). Five participants choose the incorrect range: four were in the low engagement risk
condition while only one was in the high engagement risk condition. There was only one
participant who failed both engagement risk manipulation checks. This participant was
eliminated from the study.
Second, each participant was asked to indicate whether the focus of the PCAOB
inspection process included in the materials was an effectiveness approach or a balanced
approach. Seventy-three of the 76 participants correctly responded to this manipulation check
(96 percent). The three participants who responded incorrectly were eliminated from the study.
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Third, one participant answered all answers by marking the extreme left throughout the
entire instrument including all questions and demographics, so it appears this participant did not
take the task seriously and was eliminated. Thus, seventy-one (of 76) participants were included
in the study. The five participants were eliminated for the following reasons: one participant
failed both engagement risk manipulations, three participants failed the PCAOB focus
manipulation, and one subject did not take the task seriously.26
Finally, I tested the manipulation of the riskiness of the tests as follows. I asked the
participants to rate the riskiness of each of the four tests of controls and four substantive
procedures using an 11 point scale ranging from low riskiness (0) to moderate riskiness (5) to
high riskiness (10). Riskiness was stated in terms of the assertion(s) being tested. I calculated the
mean for the two low risk tests of controls and the mean for the two high risk tests of controls;
and performed the same calculation for the two levels of riskiness for the substantive procedures.
I then compared the means within each type of test. For the tests of controls, the two high risk
tests of controls were judged significantly more risky than the two low risk tests of controls
(mean = 6.24 v. 4.24; t =8.46; p<0.000). Similarly, for substantive procedures, the two high risk
substantive procedures were judged more risky than the two low risk substantive procedures
(mean = 7.21 v. 4.40; t = 9.59; p<0.000). Thus, the manipulation was successful for riskiness of
the types of tests.
I also asked two other questions about the materials. First, I asked the participants how
likely that the SunTek engagement would be selected by the PCAOB for inspection. Likelihood
was measured along a continuum from not likely to highly likely using an 11 point scale ranging
from not likely (0) to highly likely (10). The average rating was 6.77 across all participants. This
26

The exclusion of responses of the participants failing at least one manipulation check for engagement risk
produced similar results for all hypotheses testing. The inclusion of all responses of the participants who were
eliminated produced similar results for all hypotheses testing.
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is significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale (t-test = 6.67, p = .000); indicating that the
participants believed it was likely that the SunTek engagement would be selected by the PCAOB
for inspection. Second, I asked the participants to rate the competence and the objectivity of
SunTek’s internal audit function. The rating was measured along a continuum from low to high
using an 11 point scale ranging from low (0) to moderate (5) to high (10). The average rating
across all participants was 9.94. This is significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale (t-test
= 29.69; p = .000); indicating that the participants believed the internal audit function was
competent and objective.
5.2

Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.1 contains the descriptive statistics for auditors’ reliance decisions across the two

levels of engagement risk. Remember that the dependent variables were calculated as the mean
for the high and low condition by each type of test. Thirty-seven participants were in the low
engagement risk condition whereas 34 participants were in the high engagement risk condition.
The overall means of the auditors’ reliance measure for low engagement risk were 6.30 vs. 4.44
for the high engagement risk condition. When comparing the means between high and low
engagement risk, auditors’ reliance is significantly lower for the high condition than for the low
condition (F = 24.61; p=.000).
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics for Auditors’ Reliance Decisions by Engagement Risk
ER
Low

Mean

High

Total

TCLow
8.18

TCHigh
5.42

STLow
4.47

STHigh
7.15

Total
6.30

Std.
Deviation
N
Mean

(1.65)

(1.88)

(2.59)

(2.01)

(2.03)

37
5.84

37
4.32

37
2.89

37
4.78

37
4.44

Std.
Deviation
N

(2.29)

(1.87)

(1.41)

(1.58)

(1.79)

34

34

34

34

34

7.06

4.89

3.69

6.01

5.41

(2.29)

(1.94)

(2.25)

(2.16)

(2.16)

71

71

71

71

71

Mean
Std.
Deviation
N

Variable Definitions:
ER = Engagement Risk
Low = low engagement risk
High = high engagement risk
TCLow = average means of the two low risk tests of controls responses
TCHigh= average means of the two high risk tests of controls responses
STLow = average means of the two low risk substantive tests responses
STHigh = average means of the two high risk substantive tests responses

Table 5.2 contains the descriptive statistics for auditors’ reliance decisions across the two
levels for the focus of the PCAOB inspection process. Thirty-one participants were in the
Effectiveness Focus condition whereas 40 participants were in the Balanced Focus condition.
The overall means of the auditors’ reliance measure for effectiveness condition were 4.47 vs.
6.14 for the balanced condition. When comparing the means between effectiveness condition
and the balanced conditions, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function is significantly
lower for the effectiveness condition than for the balanced condition (F = 13.81; p=.000).
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics for Auditors’ Reliance Decisions by Focus of PCAOB
Inspection
FOCUS
Effectiveness

Mean

Balanced

Total

TCLow
6.00

TCHigh
3.55

STLow
2.44

STHigh
5.90

Total
4.47

Std.
Deviation
N
Mean

(2.38)

(1.40)

(1.45)

(2.00)

(1.81)

31
7.88

31
5.94

31
4.66

31
6.10

31
6.14

Std.
Deviation
N

(1.88)

(1.64)

(2.29)

(2.30)

(2.03)

40

40

40

40

40

7.06

4.89

3.69

6.01

5.41

(2.29)

(1.94)

(2.25)

(2.16)

(2.16)

71

71

71

71

71

Mean
Std.
Deviation
N

Variable Definitions:
FOCUS = focus of the PCAOB Inspection Process
Effectiveness = focus is on effectiveness
Balanced = focus is on a balance between effectiveness/efficiency
TCLow = average means of the two low risk tests of controls responses
TCHigh= average means of the two high risk tests of controls responses
STLow = average means of the two low risk substantive tests responses
STHigh = average means of the two high risk substantive tests responses

Table 5.3 contains the descriptive statistics for the auditors’ reliance decisions by each
type, and riskiness, of test. The mean for tests of controls (TC) (5.98) is significantly higher than
the mean for substantive tests (ST) (4.85) (t-test = 5.76, p = .000), indicating that the auditors
relied more on the internal audit function when testing controls. The means of the auditors’
reliance measure for TChigh vs. TCLow were 4.89 vs. 7.06 (t-test = 9.05; p=.000). The means of
the auditors’ reliance measure for SThigh vs. STLow were 3.69 vs. 6.01 (t-test = 7.81; p=.000).
This shows that the auditors’ reliance decisions were significantly higher for the low risk tests
versus the high risk tests.
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Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Auditors’ Reliance Decisions by the Type and Riskiness
of the Test

N
TC1
TC2
TCLow
TC3
TC4
TCHigh
Overall TC
ST1
ST2
STLow
ST3
ST4
STHigh
Overall ST

71
71
71
71
71
71
142
71
71
71
71
71
71
142

Minimum Maximum
1.0
11.0
1.0
11.0
1.0
11.0
1.0
11.0
1.0
11.0
1.0
9.0
1.0
11.0
1.0
10.0
1.0
11.0
1.0
10.5
1.0
11.0
1.0
9.0
1.0
9.0
1.0
10.5

Mean
7.10
7.01
7.06
4.94
4.85
4.89
5.98
4.68
7.35
6.01
3.62
3.76
3.69
4.85

Std.
Deviation
2.61
2.54
2.29
2.08
2.51
1.94
1.87
2.21
2.96
2.16
2.84
2.30
2.25
1.81

Variable Definitions:
TCLow = average means of the two low risk tests of controls responses ((TC1 + TC2) / 2)
TCHigh= average means of the two high risk tests of controls responses ((TC3 + TC4) / 2)
Overall TC = average means between TCLow and TCHigh
STLow = average means of the two low risk substantive tests responses ((ST1 +ST2) / 2)
STHigh = average means of the two high risk substantive tests responses ((ST3 + ST4) / 2)
Overall ST = average means between STLow and STHigh

5.3

Test of the Overall Model
Prior to testing the research hypotheses, I perform a repeated measures ANOVA for the

full model with Engagement Risk (ER) and Focus of the PCOAB Inspection (FOCUS) as
between-subjects factors, and Riskiness of the Test (RiskT) and the Type of Test (TT) as
repeated measures factors, and all interaction effects. The results are presented in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4: Test of the Full Modela

Intercept

Sum of
Squares
7738.45

1

Mean
Squares
7738.45

F
1486.96

p-values*
.000

df

Between Subjects
ER

212.43

1

212.43

40.82

.000

FOCUS

167.80

1

167.80

32.24

.000

.43

1

.43

.08

.774

348.68

67

5.20

378.38

1

378.38

170.69

.000

ER * RiskT

24.42

1

24.42

11.01

.001

FOCUS * RiskT

30.29

1

30.29

13.67

.000

ER * FOCUS * RiskT

13.92

1

13.92

6.28

.008

148.52

67

2.22

83.80

1

83.80

35.32

.000

1.00

1

1.00

.42

.518

FOCUS * TT

16.21

1

16.21

6.83

.011

ER * FOCUS * TT

13.35

1

13.35

5.62

.021

158.98

67

2.37

1.32

1

1.32

.63

.429

.59

1

.59

.29

.595

9.52

1

9.52

4.58

.036

.24

.627

ER * FOCUS
Error
Within Subjects
RiskT

Error (RiskT)
TT
ER * TT

Error (TT)
RiskT * TT
ER * RiskT * TT
FOCUS * RiskT * TT
ER * FOCUS * RiskT * TT
Error (RiskT*TT)

.50

1

.50

139.32

67

2.08

a

The dependent variable is the external auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function on an 11 point scale ranging from no
reliance (0) to moderate reliance (5) to extensive reliance (10) for each of the relevant tests. Refer back to Section 4.2.2
*p-values are one-tailed if hypothesized in a direction, and two-tailed otherwise.
Variable Definitions:
ER = Engagement Risk was tested at two levels: low or high
FOCUS = Focus of the PCAOB Inspection was tested at two levels: effectiveness focus or balanced focus
RiskT = Riskiness of the Test was tested at two levels: low or high
TT = Type of Test was tested at two types: tests of controls or substantive procedures
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Table 5.5 presents the least square (adjusted) means for the 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design model
used to examine the hypotheses 1-3.
Table 5.5 Least Square Means for the Test of Three Factors
(Engagement Risk, Focus of the Inspection and the Riskiness of the test)
RiskT
Low
High

ER
Low
High
Low
High

Focus
Effectiveness
7.35*
xA
4.64*
xC
3.32*
xE
2.69*
xG

xB
xD
xF
xH

Balanced
7.87*
5.90*
6.06*
4.37*

*Least square (adjusted) means for auditors’ reliance decisions across the two types of tests from the overall model.
Variable Definitions:
ER = Engagement Risk was tested at two levels: low or high
FOCUS = Focus of the PCAOB Inspection was tested at two levels: effectiveness focus or balanced focus
RiskT = Riskiness of the Test was tested at two levels: low or high
TT = Type of Test was tested at two types: tests of controls or substantive procedures

5.4

Hypothesis 1 – The Effect of ER
H1 predicts as engagement risk increases, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function

will decrease. As Table 5.4 shows, there is a significant main effect for ER (F = 40.82; p = 000).
As predicted, the adjusted mean for low ER condition (6.15) is higher than the mean for the high
ER condition (4.40). Thus H1 is supported. Additionally, H1 suggests an ordinal relationship
from Table 4.4 as follows: x A > x C, x B > x D, x E > x G, and x F > x H. As shown in Table 5.5,
the adjusted means results are all in the predicted direction: 7.35 > 4.64, 7.87 > 5.90, 3.32 >
2.69, and 6.06 > 4.37.
5.5

Hypothesis 2 – The Effect of RiskT
H2 predicts that the lower the riskiness of the test, the more reliance the auditors will

place on the internal audit function. Table 5.4 shows a significant main effect for RiskT (F =
170.69; p = 0.00). As predicted, the adjusted mean for the low riskiness tests (6.44) is higher
than the mean for the high riskiness tests (4.11). Thus, H2 is supported. Additionally, H2
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suggests an ordinal relationship from Table 4.4 as follows: x A > x E, x B > x F, x C > x G, and
x D > x H. As seen in Table 5.5, the adjusted means results are all in the predicted direction:

7.35 > 3.32, 7.87 > 6.06, 4.64 > 2.69, and 5.90 > 4.37.
5.6

Hypothesis 3 – The Interaction of Engagement Risk, Focus of the Inspection Process
and Riskiness of the Test
As noted in Table 5.4, there are significant main effects for ER, RiskT and three

significant interactions that contain RiskT that are significant: ER x RiskT (F=11.01; p=.001),
Focus x RiskT (F=13.67; p=.000), and ER x FOCUS x RiskT (F = 6.28; p = 0.008).27 It is the
significant ER x FOCUS x RiskT that is relevant for H3a and H3b.
H3a predicts that when RiskT is low, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function will
be higher in the balanced FOCUS condition regardless of the level of engagement risk. This
suggests that the ER x FOCUS interaction will not be significant and that FOCUS will be
significant across both levels of ER. Figure 5.3 (Panel A) plots the adjusted means when RiskT is
low.28 The effect of ER x FOCUS is insignificant (F = 1.02; p = .316) and FOCUS is significant
and in the correct direction (adjusted means for balance focus = 6.89 v. effectiveness focus =
6.00; F = 6.00; p = .017). Follow up tests show that while the effect of FOCUS is significantly
positive when ER is High (adjusted means for balanced focus = 5.90 v. 4.64 in the effectiveness
focus; t =2.47; p=.019), the effect of FOCUS is not significant (although in the correct direction)
when ER is Low (adjusted means for balanced focus = 7.87 v. 7.35 for the effectiveness focus;
t = 1.01; p=.320). Thus, H3a is partially supported. My findings for H3a shows that when the
riskiness of the tests is low and engagement is low that external auditors rely equally on the
internal audit function regardless of the focus of the PCAOB inspection, but when engagement
27

There are other interaction terms that are significant (ER x FOCUS x TT and FOCUS x RiskT x TT). However,
these terms relate to TT and H4, not H3a or H3b. These effects are discussed later.
28
The full results for this test and similar ones are not tabulated.

50

risk is high, the external auditors rely more on the internal audit function when the focus of the
PCAOB inspection process is balanced.
H3b predicts that when the riskiness of the test is high, the auditors’ reliance on the
internal audit function will be higher in the balanced focus condition but only when engagement
risk is low. When engagement risk is high, there will be no difference between the auditors’
reliance on the internal audit function across the two focuses of the PCAOB inspection process.
This suggests that the ER x FOCUS interaction will be significant and that the effect of FOCUS
will only be significant when ER is low. Figure 5.3 (Panel B) plots the means. The effect of ER x
FOCUS is significant (F = 3.25; p = .038, one-tailed). However, the effect of FOCUS overall is
also significant (adjusted means for balance condition = 5.22 v. 3.00 in the effectiveness
condition; F = 61.02; p = .000). Follow up tests show that the effect of FOCUS is significant
when ER is Low (adjusted means for balanced focus = 6.06 v. 3.32 in the effectiveness focus; t =
5.85; p=.000) and when ER is High (adjusted means for balanced focus = 4.38 v. 2.69 in the
effectiveness focus; t =5.55; p=.000). Thus, H3b is partially supported. Thus, my findings for H3b
hold when ER is low but not when ER is high. Overall, the results for H3b indicate that when the
riskiness of the tests is high that auditors rely on the internal audit function more when the focus
of the PCAOB inspection process is balanced regardless of the level of engagement risk.
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Figure 5.3: Two-way interaction for Riskiness of the Tests
Panel A

Panel B
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5.7

Hypothesis 4 – Type of Tests
H4 predicts that auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function will be greater for tests of

controls than for substantive procedures. Table 5.4 shows a significant main effect for TT
(F=35.316, p = 000). As predicted, the adjusted mean for test of controls (5.98) is higher than the
adjusted mean for substantive procedures (4.85) (t-test = 5.76; p = .000). Thus, H4 is supported.
However, there are three significant interaction terms that contain TT and potentially moderate
the main effect: FOCUS x TT (F = 6.830; p = .011), ER x FOCUS x TT (F=5.624, p=.021), and
FOCUS x RiskT x TT (F = 4.8; p = .36). Thus, I conduct post hoc analysis. 29
I first analyze the three way interaction ER x FOCUS x TT by conducting simple effects
tests of the interaction of ER x FOCUS by each level of TT. Under both TT conditions, the
interaction of ER x FOCUS was not significant (TC: F = 1.26; p = .266; SP: F = 2.32; p =.133).
Figure 5.4 (Panel A) plots the means for TC. For the tests of controls condition, the balanced
focus always dominates the effectiveness focus. For low engagement risk, the mean in the
balanced condition (7.48) is significantly higher than in the effectiveness condition (5.80)
(F=15.82; p=.000). When engagement risk is high, the mean for the balanced condition (6.21) is
significantly higher than the mean in the effectiveness condition (3.81) (F=24.37; p=.000). When
using test of controls, I find that the external auditors rely significantly more on the internal audit
function when the PCAOB inspection focus is balanced compared to an effectiveness focus
regardless of the level of engagement risk.
Figure 5.4 (Panel B) plots the means for the substantive procedures condition. In the
substantive procedures condition, focus of the PCAOB inspection did not have the same impact
on the auditors’ reliance decisions as in the test of controls. For low engagement risk, the mean
29

I also split the full model and examined the dependent variables for each type of test separately. The results were qualitatively
the same.
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in the balanced condition (6.45) is moderately significant compared to the effectiveness
condition (4.87) (F = 8.63; p = .06). In the high engagement risk condition, the mean in the
balanced condition (4.07) is not significantly different than the mean in the effectiveness
condition (3.52) (F = 1.92; p = .175). Thus, when considering reliance on the internal audit
function to perform substantive procedures, auditors’ reliance decisions depend on the level of
engagement risk and not the focus of the inspection as in the tests of controls.
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Figure 5.4: Two-way interaction for Type of the Tests
Panel A

Panel B

Next, I examine the significant three-way interaction between FOCUS x RiskT x TT by
conducting simple effects tests of the interaction of FOCUS x RiskT by each level of TT. For
tests of control condition, the interaction of FOCUS x RiskT was not significant (F =1.14; p
=.289), but it was significant for substantive procedures (F =13.50; p =.000).
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Figure 5.5 (Panel A) plots the adjusted means. For the test of controls condition, the low
RiskT condition always dominates the high RiskT condition. In the balanced condition, the mean
in the low RiskT condition (6.00) is significantly greater than the mean in the high RiskT
condition (3.55) (F=38.90; p=.000). Similarly, in the effectiveness condition, the mean for the
low RiskT condition (7.88) is significantly greater than the mean in the high RiskT condition
(5.94) (F=43.35; p=.000). Auditors’ reliance decisions for tests of controls are always higher
when the riskiness of the test is low regardless of the focus of the PCAOB inspection.
Figure 5.5 (Panel B) plots the means for the substantive procedures condition. In the
balanced condition, the mean in the low RiskT condition (5.90) is significantly greater than the
mean in the high RiskT condition (2.44) (F=81.65; p=.000). In the effectiveness condition, the
mean for the low RiskT condition (6.10) was significantly greater than the mean in the high
RiskT condition (4.66) (F=13.95; p=.001). Again, it appears that the riskiness of the test
dominates in both the balanced and effectiveness focus conditions for substantive procedures.
I next examine the riskiness of the tests across focus conditions, the means for the low RiskT
condition between the effectiveness condition (5.90) and the balanced condition (6.10) was not
significantly different (F = .14; p = .707). However, the means in the high RiskT condition
between effectiveness condition (2.44) and balanced condition (4.66) were significantly different
(F = 22.38; p = .000). Thus, when using substantive tests, I find that the auditors’ reliance
decisions when the riskiness of the test is low were not impacted by the focus of the inspection,
but were impacted when the riskiness of the test is high. In the high RiskT condition, the auditors
relied more on the internal audit function when the focus of the PCAOB inspection process was
balanced.
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To summarize, H4 predicted there would be a difference between the auditors’ reliance
decisions on the test of controls and the substantive procedures. This was supported. However,
the presence of interaction terms moderated this finding. Post hoc analysis showed that when
planning test of controls, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function was always greater
when the riskiness of the test was low, engagement risk was low, and the focus of the PCAOB
inspection process was balanced. However, the auditors’ reliance decisions when planning
substantive procedures shows the following. First, when considering reliance on the internal
audit function to perform substantive procedures, auditors’ reliance decisions depend on the level
of engagement risk and not the focus of the inspection. Second, when riskiness of the substantive
test is low, the auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function was not impacted by the focus of
the PCAOB inspection process. Third, when the riskiness of the substantive test was high, the
auditors relied more on the internal audit function when the focus of the PCAOB’s inspection
process was balanced.
Section 5.2 through 5.7 provides support that engagement risk, focus of the inspection,
riskiness of the test, and the type of test impact auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit
function. The impact of each depended on the conditions the auditor faced when making their
reliance decisions.
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Figure 5.5: Two-way interaction for Type of Tests
Panel A

Panel B

5.8

Conclusions
Chapter 5 describes the statistical analysis performed to test Hypotheses 1 through 4.

Hypothesis 1 predicts that as engagement risk increases, auditors’ reliance decisions on the
internal audit function will decrease. I find support for my hypothesis. Hypothesis 2 predicts
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that the lower the riskiness of the test, the more reliance the auditors will place on the internal
audit function and I find support for this prediction. Hypotheses 3a and 3b predict a three-way
interaction between engagement risk, focus of the inspection, and the riskiness of the test. I find
partial support for these two hypotheses. Lastly, Hypothesis 4 predicts that auditors’ reliance on
the internal audit function should differ based on the type of test that is being used. I do find
support for this prediction. I find that auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function is greater
for tests of controls than for substantive procedures. I also find that when planning test of
controls, auditors’ reliance decisions are greater when the riskiness of the test and engagement
risk are low and the focus of the PCAOB inspection process is a more balanced approach.
However; when planning substantive procedures, auditors’ reliance decisions depend on the
engagement risk level and not the focus of the inspection. When riskiness of the substantive test
is low, the auditors’ reliance decisions are not impacted by the focus of the inspection. When the
riskiness of the substantive test was high, auditors’ reliance decisions are greater under the
balanced focus of inspection versus the effectiveness focus. Chapter 6 concludes this
dissertation with a discussion of results, contributions, limitation, and avenues for future
research.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate how auditors’ reliance decisions on the
internal audit function will be affected by the competing pressures from different inspection
focuses, varying levels of engagement risk, and the level of risk associated with an audit test.
This chapter concludes this dissertation with a summary of results in Section 6.1, a discussion of
the contributions in Section 6.2, and an evaluation of the limitations and suggestions for future
research in Section 6.3.
6.1

Summary of Results
My findings suggest that auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit function are

impacted by different inspection focuses, varying levels of engagement risk, and the level of the
risk associated with the audit test. I examined two differing PCAOB inspection focuses (one on
effectiveness only and one on a more balanced approach between effectiveness and efficiency);
two different engagement risk levels (low and high); two levels of the riskiness of the tests (low
and high); and two types of tests (tests of controls and substantive procedures).
Overall, I find that as engagement risk and/or riskiness of the test increased, auditors’
reliance decisions decreased, but the interesting finding is how auditors’ reliance decisions were
affected by the interaction between engagement risk, PCAOB inspection focus, and riskiness of
the test. When riskiness of the tests is low and engagement risk is high, the external auditors rely
more on the internal audit function when the focus of the PCAOB inspection process is balanced.
However, when engagement risk is low, the external auditors rely equally on the internal audit
function regardless of the focus of the PCAOB inspection. When the riskiness of the tests is
high, I find that the external auditors also rely significantly more on the internal audit function
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when the PCAOB inspection focus is balanced compared to an effectiveness focus regardless of
the level of engagement risk. Lastly, I find that there is a difference between the auditors’
reliance decisions on the test of controls and the substantive procedures. Overall, auditors’ rely
more on the internal audit function for tests of controls than substantive procedures. Some
interesting differences, however, were identified. When using test of controls, external auditors
rely more on the internal audit function when the focus of the inspection is a more balanced
approach, the riskiness of the test and engagement risk are low as compared to when the focus of
inspection is effectiveness only, or the riskiness of the test and engagement risk are high.
External auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit function, when using substantive
procedures, depend on the engagement risk level and not the focus of the inspection. When the
riskiness of the substantive test is low, the focus of the inspection does not have an impact on the
auditors’ reliance decision. When riskiness of the substantive test is high, auditors’ reliance in
the balanced focus of inspection is higher than the effectiveness focus.
6.2

Contributions
This dissertation has important implications for auditors, regulators, academics and other

interested stakeholders. First, it extends the research on the PCAOB’s inspection process and
how it influences auditors’ reliance decisions on the work of others (i.e., the internal audit
function). Thus, this study extends the internal audit literature by examining how the inspection
process by the PCAOB affects auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal auditor function
(Gramling 1999, Felix et al. 2001, Felix et al. 2005. Under the balanced focus of the inspection,
auditors’ rely more on the internal audit function than under an effectiveness focus across
differing levels of engagement risk and riskiness of tests. Second, policy setters for external
auditors may wish to consider the focus they are using for their inspections, the selection process

61

for audit inspections, and its impact on external auditors reliance decisions. AS5 allows the
external auditor to rely more on the work of others when conducting an audit of ICFR. My
findings suggest that auditors’ rely more on the internal audit function when using tests of
controls than substantive procedures. Possible unintended consequences from this regulatory
change is that even under higher engagement risk and higher riskiness of tests, auditors’ may rely
more on the internal audit function when faced with the balanced inspection focus versus the
effectiveness inspection focus. Third, auditors face increased pressure to maintain a high level of
effectiveness while increasing the efficiency of their audits. My findings suggest that auditors
under high levels of engagement risk still relied more on the internal audit function under the
balanced inspection focus versus the effectiveness inspection focus, but the riskiness of the tests
also impacted the level of the auditors’ reliance. Lastly, this study extends the research on how
engagement risk influences auditors’ decision-making behavior (e.g., Knapp 1985; Walo 1995;
Hackenbrack & Nelson 1996; Johnstone 2000) by examining engagement risk under the new
regulatory pressures of the PCAOB inspection process.
6.3

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
Experiments abstract from the real world and sacrifice some external validity (Bonner

1999). To mitigate external validity issues, I performed a thorough experimental analysis.
Nonetheless, this dissertation has several limitations. First, results are generalizable only to the
extent that experimental participants are representative of the population of external auditors that
make reliance decisions on the internal audit function. Second, I focused my research on only
two levels of the focus for the PCAOB inspection process. Future research should look at other
possibilities. Third, engagement risk was set at the extremes (either high or low). In the real
world, auditors face a continuum of engagement risk levels. Future research should investigate
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how the levels of the engagement risk interact with the level of the focus of the PCAOB. Fourth,
I was limited to choosing only eight procedures for auditors to make reliance decisions. The
results may not hold for other audit procedures or tests.
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APPENDIX A
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS

The following pages show the computer screen appearance for the entire experimental
instrument for Case 1 where the manipulation for engagement risk was low and the PCAOB
inspection focus was on effectiveness. The manipulations that were used in Case 2 through 4 for
the Suntek Case are included after the final page of Case 1.
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On the next two pages you will be asked to rate the riskiness of the test of controls and audit
procedures that you previously evaluated for the reliance on the work of the internal audit function.
These ratings should be considered independent of the ratings for the reliance decision. In rating the
test of controls and audit procedures, you should consider their riskiness in terms of the assertion(s)
being tested for SunTek along a continuum from low to high risk.
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Manipulation between different instruments:
Engagement Risk (High):
Company Overview:
SunTek Inc. is a leading developer of digital laser imaging and chemistry-free plate technologies
for the printing and graphic arts industries. SunTek is a large publicly traded company. SunTek
developed and recently began selling an innovative new product. The company started selling the
product in October of the prior year. Although initial sales were encouraging, the company was
narrowly in compliance with restrictive debt covenants from which waivers had been obtained in
the past. Also, management bonuses are tied to sales targets and the client just did meet these
sales targets. Key financial ratios for the current year are below industry average as were the
prior year ratios. The company has been an audit client of the firm for the past two years.
Engagement risk is defined as the risk that the audit firm is exposed to loss or injury from
litigation, adverse publicity, or other events arising in connection with the integrated audited
financial statements (AU 312.02). Your firm has assessed engagement risk as “HIGH.”

PCAOB inspection focus (Balanced):
PCAOB Inspection:
Your firm is scheduled for its annual inspection by the PCAOB. Because of the nature of your
firm’s clients, the PCAOB will use a BALANCED approach when conducting their inspection of
the firm’s integrated audits. Thus, the PCAOB inspection team will concentrate its efforts to
assess whether the significant risk areas have been properly evaluated, concluded upon, and
documented. The PCAOB inspectors will also focus on use of the work of others (i.e., internal
audit function) related to the audit of internal control over financial reporting. This change is
intended to lead to a more efficient audit of internal control over financial reporting.
At this time it is uncertain that the SunTek audit will be selected for review by the PCAOB.
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